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I. INTRODUCTION 
A Muslim citizen of a North African country entered the United States 
through an international airport on a false French passport in January 
1999.  He admitted that he was traveling on false documents and 
immediately requested political asylum.  He was held in detention for three 
months while his asylum claim was investigated by immigration authorities, 
who sought his removal from the United States.  In April 1999, an executive 
branch immigration judge suspended his removal from the United States, 
and granted the immigrant’s request for asylum under 8 U.S.C. section 
       †      Professor of Constitutional Criminal Law, William Mitchell College of 
Law.  My thanks to James Jay Stratton, J.D. Candidate 2009, and James Graves, J.D. 
Candidate 2010, for their assistance in seeing this article through to completion. 
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1158 after a hearing in which the refugee was compelled to testify and his 
use of false documents was fully disclosed. 
Without having committed any other immigration or criminal offenses, 
the refugee was again detained in December 2003, one month before the 
running of the five-year statute of limitations for criminal charges for the 
January 1999 use of false documents.  The refugee was interrogated by 
federal officials about his knowledge, contacts and ties with Islamic groups 
in his home country and in the United States.  He was threatened with 
prosecution for his admitted use of false documents if he did not comply by 
providing information.  He was indicted in January 2004 while 
maintaining he had no information to give. 
He was held without bail until April 2004, when he was released on 
the condition that he wear an electronic bracelet pending trial.  He 
subsequently agreed to a “no-incarceration” plea agreement, when the court 
denied his motion to dismiss the indictment based on the original grant of 
asylum.  Ironically, the conviction for use of false documents, to which he 
admitted when claiming asylum in 1999, exposed the refugee to removal 
and deportation again. 
– Summary of an actual false documents prosecution.1 
 
The foregoing example of how the “War on Terrorism” is 
actually being “fought” is merely one more instance of the exercise 
of broad executive-branch powers that ranges from torture of 
detainees,2 to ethnically-targeted enforcement of immigration laws,3 
to electronic surveillance of virtually all international electronic 
communication.4  But this example is the result of a Kafka-esque 
contradiction between: (a) the executive branch grant of asylum, 
and (b) subsequent criminal prosecution by another arm of that 
same executive branch, in which the grant of asylum is not a 
 1. See Brief of Appellant at 1–4, Hafid Bradei v. United States, No. 05-2771 
(8th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005). 
 2. James C. McKinley, Jr., A Prosecutor Indicts Foes, and Cheney and Gonzales, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A24. 
 3. Laura Isabel Bauer, They Beg For Our Protection and We Refuse: U.S. Asylum 
Law’s Failure to Protect Many of Today’s Refugees, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1092–
93 (2004).  Due to the lack of documentation, asylum officers could easily hide 
discriminatory motivations or arbitrary decisions from concerned investigators.  See 
GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GGD-87-33BR, ASYLUM: UNIFORM 
APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN—FEW DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED 13–14 
(1987) (finding that INS officials were not required to document their asylum 
decisions, and thus it was “uncertain whether all applications were treated fairly 
and were held to the same standards”). 
 4. Editorial, Spies, Lies and FISA, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, § 4, at 11. 
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defense to acts the refugee was required to admit, (c) once again 
exposes the refugee to deportation.  It is a modern version of the 
unwinnable “Catch-22” that Joseph Heller lampooned in his iconic 
anti-war novel of the same name.5
But that was then, this is now, and the new “Catch-22” facing 
refugees who have been granted asylum after using false 
documents to enter the United States makes use of an apparent 
contradiction between the federal criminal code on the one hand 
and asylum/refugee statutes and treaties on the other.  These 
unresolved contradictions arguably subject all improperly 
documented on-arrival asylees to subsequent criminal prosecution, 
even though they have established the “well-founded fear of 
persecution” necessary for the grant of asylum.6
This article describes the contradictions between: (a) 
standards and procedures for seeking and receiving asylum status 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 and Article 31(1) of the United Nations 
Refugee Convention; (b) removal proceedings described in 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1227; and (c) felony criminal prosecution for 
false documents under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1543, 1544 and 1546, for which 
full disclosure of entry on false documents and a grant of asylum 
has not been recognized as a defense by Congress or the courts. 
This article suggests that full disclosure of entry on false 
documents and a subsequent grant of asylum should be a full 
defense to a post-asylum criminal prosecution for use of those same 
false documents.  This defense should arise by Congressional 
enactment, through judicial use of the Fifth Amendment, or 
through common-law concepts of estoppel or res judicata. 
II. FALSE DOCUMENTS AND ASYLUM UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Those seeking asylum status who have arrived in a member 
country of the United Nations cannot be punished for presenting 
false documents under the United Nations Refugee Convention, 
Article 31(1).  The Convention states that member countries 
cannot impose penalties on asylum seekers who enter illegally so 
long as they: (a) come directly from the country from which they 
are seeking asylum, (b) present themselves to authorities without 
 5. See generally JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (University of Michigan 1970). 
 6. A general trend toward criminalization of immigration issues has been 
noted by other commentators.  See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 469 (2007). 
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delay and (c) show good cause for their illegal entry.7
Although the Convention does not specifically apply to asylum 
seekers who have traveled through third countries before seeking 
asylum, the principle that asylum seekers cannot be punished for 
presenting false documents when entering a United Nations 
member country in order to seek political asylum has found 
support in other national jurisdictions.8  There is also considerable 
debate over whether the Refugee Convention is self-executing with 
respect to the provisions of Article 31(1),9 and therefore also part 
of domestic law.10
Also, the United States is a signatory to the 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees, which incorporates the 1951 
Convention, particularly with respect to refugees who have already 
had a determination of asylum status, as described in a public 
opinion letter by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees.11  Further, even if the Convention and Protocol are not 
held to be self-executing, and thus not incorporated into domestic 
law, the same principles enunciated in the Convention and 
Protocol have already been recognized in domestic United States 
jurisdictions.12
III. FALSE DOCUMENTS AND ASYLUM UNDER DOMESTIC LAW 
Under the Immigration Code, a non-citizen who lacks proper 
documentation to remain in the United States may be placed in 
removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (for those who have 
not formally entered the United States relying on valid immigration 
 7. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, ch. V, art. 31(1), July 28, 
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter “Refugee Convention”]. 
 8. See Regina v. Uxbridge Magistrate’s Court ex parte Adimi, [2001] Q.B. 667 
(U.K.). 
 9. Refugee Convention, supra note 7. 
 10. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1985); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1984); Douglas Gross, The Right of Asylum 
Under U.S. Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125, 1129 & n.30 (1980); Deborah Cohan, et 
al., Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee Policy, 21 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 504 (1986). 
 11. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], UNHCR’S 
POSITION ON THE CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NEEDS OF INDIVIDUALS 
FROM KOSOVO, ¶ 29 (2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/
449664ea2.pdf. 
 12. See Akinmade v. I.N.S., 196 F.3d 951, 955 (3rd Cir. 1999) (citing In re  
O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1079 (BIA 1998)).  See also Damaize-Job v. I.N.S., 787 F.2d 
1332 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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documents) and 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (for those who have entered the 
United States lawfully but who no longer have authorization to 
remain).13  In either case, an immigrant may seek asylum status 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 by establishing that he or she is a “refugee” 
as defined by section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.14  An applicant that carries his or her burden of 
 13. The following compares the methods of obtaining asylum in the United 
States: 
The two main ways of obtaining asylum in the United States are through 
the affirmative process and through the defensive process. . . . 
In the affirmative asylum process, individuals who are physically present in 
the United States, regardless of how they arrived . . . may apply for 
asylum. . . .  [A]sylum-seekers must apply for asylum within one year from 
the date of last arrival in the United States. . . .  If the applicant’s case is 
not approved . . . the case is referred to an Immigration Judge (IJ) at the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) for de novo 
consideration of the application. 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Obtaining Asylum in the United States: 
Two Paths, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (select “Services and Benefits” 
from the menu bar, then “Humanitarian Benefits,” “Asylum,” and “Obtaining 
Asylum in the United States: Two Paths”) (last visited Dec. 14, 2008).  Affirmative 
asylum applicants are subject to deportation if found ineligible by USCIS and an 
immigration judge. 
  In the defensive asylum process, applicants seek asylum as a defense against 
removal from the United States.  Immigration judges hear these applications in 
adversarial proceedings: “If the applicant is found eligible, the judge orders 
asylum to be granted.  If the applicant is found ineligible for asylum, the [judge] 
determines whether the applicant is eligible for any other forms of relief from 
removal . . . .  [D]ecisions can be appealed by either the government or the 
applicant.”  Id. 
Aliens generally are placed into defensive asylum processing in one of 
two ways: 
• they are referred to an IJ by USCIS after a finding of ineligibility at the 
conclusion of the “affirmative” asylum process, or 
• they are placed in removal proceedings because they: 
• were apprehended in the United States or at a U.S. port-of-entry 
without proper legal documents or in violation of their status, or 
• were caught trying to enter the United States without proper 
documentation and were placed in the expedited removal process 
and found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture by an 
Asylum Officer. 
Id. 
 14. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines "refugee" in section 
101(a)(42) as: 
(A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, 
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in 
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling 
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
5
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proof before an executive branch immigration judge will be 
permitted to remain in the United States under the conditions 
mandated for asylum status.15  The highest immigration 
administrative appeal authority, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA), has held that “there may be reasons, fully consistent with the 
claim of asylum, that will cause a person to possess false documents, 
such as the creation and use of a false document to escape 
persecution by facilitating travel.”16  This view has found support in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: 
[t]he BIA set forth a clear division between two categories 
of false document presentations: 
(1) the presentation of a fraudulent document in an 
asylum adjudication for the purpose of establishing 
the elements of an asylum claim; and 
(2) “the presentation of a fraudulent document for the 
purpose of escaping immediate danger from an 
alien’s country of origin or resettlement, or for the 
purpose of gaining entry into the United States.”17
Congress has also provided that those granted “asylum status” 
(whether an entry has been on false documents or not) be 
permitted to: 
particular social group, or political opinion, or 
(B) in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation 
(as defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is 
within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person 
having no nationality, within the country in which such person is 
habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.  The term "refugee" does 
not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.  For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who 
has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary 
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo 
such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control 
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of 
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or 
she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution 
for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well 
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) 
(2006). 
 15. INA § 208(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (2006). 
 16. In re O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1083. 
 17. Akinmade, 196 F.3d at 955 (quoting In re O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1081). 
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1. remain in the United States, not subject to removal or 
return;18
2. seek and secure employment in the United States; 
and19
3. travel within the United States and without.20
Apparently, Congress intended that a grant of asylum includes 
the right to remain indefinitely in the United States and to exercise 
many of the same benefits granted to permanent legal residents.21
However, on its face, the statute does not discuss the 
relationship between the grant of asylum through executive branch 
administrative adjudication and subsequent criminal prosecution 
initiated by that same executive branch based on the same acts 
upon which asylum had been granted.  Because the statute does 
not specifically provide that the immigration court’s grant of 
asylum also provides a defense to subsequent prosecution for the 
use of false documents, and because the adversary immigration 
proceedings would have required the asylum applicant to fully 
reveal and admit under oath the same facts upon which the 
criminal prosecution is based, there is no meaningful defense to a 
false-documents indictment following the grant of asylum. 
IV. PROOF OF A “WELL-FOUNDED FEAR...” 
The President has the power to determine refugee status as an 
outgrowth of executive branch authority over immigration matters, 
and can delegate that decision-making authority as he or she “may 
specify.”22  The asylum process is governed by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act under section 208 which establishes the 
guidelines and procedures for an asylum application to be 
granted.23  An asylum applicant must carry the burden of proving a 
“well founded fear of persecution” on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion,24 but cannot prevail without testifying under oath and 
 18. INA § 208(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 19. INA § 208(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 20. INA § 208(c)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(C) (2006). 
 21. INA §§ 208(c)(1)(A), (B), (C), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(c)(1)(A), (B), (C) 
(2006). 
 22. INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006). 
 23. INA § 208(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2006). 
 24. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 93 (2nd ed. 
American Immigration Law Foundation 1991). 
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being subjected to cross examination.25
V. FALSE DOCUMENTS, ENTRY AND ASYLUM 
There are several ways in which document fraud can arise 
during the entry/asylum process, depending on whether the alien 
has intentionally attempted to perpetrate a fraud by presenting 
false documents without revealing their falsity.26
First, an alien can present false documents and claim before 
an immigration official that they are properly issued documents.  If 
the documents are found to be false, the alien is barred from entry 
 25. In re Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116, 118 (BIA 1989). 
 26. Under revisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act to address the 
problems of document fraud, Congress enacted the “Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996” (IIRAIRA).  Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.  The changes to INA § 274C increased the penalties 
for document fraud.  Juan P. Osuna, The 1996 Immigration Act: Document Fraud and 
Alien Smuggling, 73 No. 44 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1605, 1605 (Nov. 18, 1996).  
Section 274C(a) makes it unlawful for a person or entity knowingly: 
(1) to forge, counterfeit, alter, or falsely make any document for the 
purpose of satisfying a requirement of this chapter or to obtain a 
benefit under this chapter, 
(2) to use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive or to 
provide any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document 
in order to satisfy any requirement of this chapter or to obtain a 
benefit under this chapter, 
(3) to use or attempt to use or to provide or attempt to provide any 
document lawfully issued to or with respect to a person other than 
the possessor (including a deceased individual) for the purpose of 
satisfying a requirement of this chapter or obtaining a benefit under 
this chapter, 
(4) to accept or receive or to provide any document lawfully issued to or 
with respect to a person other than the possessor (including a 
deceased individual) for the purpose of complying with section 
1324a(b) of this title or obtaining a benefit under this chapter, or 
(5) to prepare, file, or assist another in preparing or filing, any 
application for benefits under this chapter, or any document 
required under this chapter, or any document submitted in 
connection with such application or document, with knowledge or 
in reckless disregard of the fact that such application or document 
was falsely made or, in whole or in part, does not relate to the person 
on whose behalf it was or is being submitted, or 
(6) (A) to present before boarding a common carrier for the purpose of 
coming to the United States a document which relates to the alien's 
eligibility to enter the United States, and (B) to fail to present such 
document to an immigration officer upon arrival at a United States 
port of entry. 
INA § 274C(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (2006). 
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to the United States.27  Second, if the alien presents falsified 
documents, and the falsity of those documents is not discovered 
until after entry into the United States, the alien is subject to 
federal civil and criminal penalties in addition to immigration 
penalties.28  Third, if an alien destroys documents en route to the 
United States and arrives without documents, the alien would be 
similarly ineligible for entry29 absent a congressionally-mandated 
exception for asylum seekers.30
However, if an alien were to arrive before an immigration 
official and disclose the fact that the alien has shown false 
documentation to board a United States common carrier abroad 
and presents the false documents upon entry, the alien may seek 
asylum.31  Although it is lawful to request asylum upon entry on an 
admittedly false document, Congress has not excluded subsequent 
criminal prosecution for the use of those false documents, even 
when the alien’s asylum claim has been granted.32
 27. “Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks 
to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other 
documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit 
provided under this Act is inadmissible.”  INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2006).
 28. INA § 274C, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2006). 
 29. “[P]resent[ing] before boarding a common carrier for the purpose of 
coming to the United States a document which relates to the alien’s eligibility to 
enter the United States, and . . . fail[ing] to present such document to an 
immigration officer upon arrival at a United States port of entry” is prohibited.  
INA § 274C(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(6) (2006).  Any alien in violation of INA 
section 274C is subject to deportation and may be found inadmissible to the 
United States as well as having to pay civil monetary fines. 
 30. INA section 274C(a)(6) establishes document fraud liability for aliens 
who fail to present an entry document upon arrival in the United States after 
having presented such a document to board a common carrier to the United 
States.  INA § 274C(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(6) (2006).  Recognizing the fact 
that genuine asylum seekers are prejudiced by this part of the statute, however, 
Congress enacted a discretionary waiver for persons granted asylum or 
withholding from deportation.  Juan P. Osuna, supra note 26, at 1607. 
 31. Providing for a waiver for false documents is in line with In re D-L- & A-M-, 
20 I. & N. Dec. 409 (BIA 1991), which held that two Cuban nationals were not 
excludable for fraud or misrepresentation when they used fraudulent Spanish 
passports to board a U.S.-bound airplane.  Id. at 413.  Upon arrival the Cuban 
nationals revealed their true identities and immediately sought asylum.  Id.  This 
case provides an example of the proper use of a waiver in those situations where 
an alien obtains a false passport to be able to board an airplane for the purposes of 
arriving in the United States to seek asylum. 
 32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006) (forgery or false use of passport); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1544 (2006) (misuse of passport).  See also discussion infra Part VIII. 
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VI. “ENTRY” INTO THE U.S. AND ASYLUM CLAIMS 
The asylum application process begins when an applicant 
arrives in the United States by presenting herself or himself at an 
immigration port of entry, which includes border entry points and 
international airports.33  How the alien arrived in the United States 
matters with respect to whether the alien will be eligible for asylum 
or not.34  An immigration official, charged with verifying passport 
and visa information and visa documents, is the first contact point 
at which applicants may seek asylum—by informing the 
Immigration Officer they are seeking asylum or are in fear of 
persecution.35
The administrative decision-making process begins with a non-
adversarial interview with an asylum officer within forty-five days of 
the arrival of the alien to the United States.36  The asylum applicant 
has the burden of providing all information concerning identity, 
including name, date and place of birth, and nationality.37  The 
asylum officer has discretion to grant or deny asylum; the officer 
may also refer an asylum applicant to an immigration judge for 
determination of the legitimacy of the asylum claim based on the 
testimony of the applicant and corroborative evidence produced in 
a trial-like administrative proceeding before an immigration 
judge.38
 33. See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2006). 
 34. Noncitizens are subject to expedited removal if the immigration officer at 
the port of entry denies admission based on false documents or no documents.  
INA §§ 212(a)(6)(C), (a)(7), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7) (2006) (regarding 
inadmissibility); INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2006) (regarding expedited 
removal). 
 35. A noncitizen who arrives on false or no documents, and is subject to 
expedited removal under INA section 235(b) and who indicates an intention to 
apply for asylum or expresses fear of prosecution, a fear of torture, or a fear of 
return to his or her country, must be referred to an asylum officer for a 
determination of credible fear of persecution or torture.  8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) 
(2008). 
 36. INA § 208(d)(5)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 37. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2008).  One of the main reasons that the verification 
is made is to determine if the asylum seeker is inadmissible due to criminal 
history or to determine if there are asylum ineligibility issues.  See id.  Asylum 
will not be granted unless and until the identity of the asylum seeker is verified 
through the Automated Visa Lookout System.  INA § 208(d)(5)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(d)(5)(A)(i) (2006).  The identity is then checked against all of the 
databases maintained by the Attorney General or Secretary of State.  Id. 
 38. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b)–(c) (2008).  If the individual is found to have 
credible fear, the individual is placed in withholding-of-removal proceedings 
before an immigration judge for full consideration of the request for withholding 
10
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VII.   IMMIGRATION REMOVAL/ASYLUM HEARINGS 
Proceedings before an immigration judge are contested 
hearings, in which the executive branch is represented by an 
attorney for the Department of Homeland Security Division.39  
Although evidentiary rules are relaxed as compared to proceedings 
in Article III trial courts,40 the hearings are conducted in a judicial 
atmosphere and immigration judges are required to tape-record 
the reasonable-fear review proceedings.41  The burden of proof 
regarding the refugee status of the applicant for asylum remains on 
the applicant42 and the immigration judge may not grant asylum 
without the applicant’s testimony under oath and exposure to 
cross-examination by a DHS attorney.43
This means that before an applicant who has submitted false 
documents to enter the United States can obtain asylum, an 
executive branch administrative law judge must find that the 
applicant’s use of false documents was justified and was not a bar to 
the initial grant of asylum.  And although this finding may be 
appealed by either party,44 there is no question that once this 
finding has become final it is binding on further actions by either 
BCIS or ICE.  The review of an immigration judge’s decision on 
asylum claims will be subject to de novo review on nonfactual issues 
and the clearly erroneous standard on factual issues, including the 
credibility of testimony.45  A decision of an immigration judge 
becomes administratively final upon waiver of appeal or upon 
expiration of the time to appeal if no appeal is taken.46  However, 
only.  8 CFR § 208.31(e) (2008). 
 39. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
OFFICE OF THE IMMIGRATION CHIEF JUDGE, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE COURT MANUAL, 
ch. 4 (June 20, 2008), available at 2008 WL 4335214. 
 40. ANKER, supra note 24, at 89. 
 41. Memorandum from the Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office 
of the Chief Immigration Judge, Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 
No. 99-5: Implementation of Article 3 of the U.N. Convention Against Torture 
(May 14, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm99/ 
99_5.pdf.  But see Bauer, supra note 3, at 1093 (citing “The Epidavros Project 
2000,” Bauer states that “[n]o cameras or recording devices are allowed at these 
hearings, and the entire process is ‘closed and confidential.’”). 
 42. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2008). 
 43. In re Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116, 117–18 (BIA 1989); INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2006). 
 44. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) (2008). 
 45. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (2008); In re S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462, 464 (BIA 
2002). 
 46. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39 (2008). 
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there is no mention of the finding of refugee status—and the grant 
of asylum—having any preclusive effect on criminal charges arising 
from the refugee’s use of false documents to enter the United 
States. 
XII.   CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR ENTRY ON FALSE DOCUMENTS 
Three sections of the U.S. Code are most directly implicated in 
criminal prosecutions for the use of false immigration documents.  
The first, 18 U.S.C. § 1543, establishes penalties for up to ten years 
for a person who: 
willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or 
furnishes to another for use any such false, forged, 
counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or 
instrument purporting to be a passport, or any passport 
validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of 
any condition therein prescribed invalidating the same 
. . . .47
In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 1544 criminalizes misuse of a passport: 
Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to 
use, any passport issued or designed for the use of 
another; or whoever willfully and knowingly uses or 
attempts to use any passport in violation of the conditions 
or restrictions therein contained, or of the rules 
prescribed pursuant to the laws regulating the issuance of 
passports; or whoever willfully and knowingly furnishes, 
disposes of, or delivers a passport to any person, for use by 
another than the person for whose use it was originally 
issued and designed. . . .48
And finally, 18 U.S.C. § 1546 criminalizes fraud and misuse of visas, 
permits, and other documents: 
Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or 
falsely makes any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, 
permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt 
card, or other document prescribed by statute or 
regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay 
or employment in the United States, or utters, uses, 
attempts to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any 
such visa, permit, border crossing card, alien registration 
receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (2006). 
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regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay 
or employment in the United States, knowing it to be 
forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to have 
been procured by means of any false claim or statement, 
or to have been otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully 
obtained. . . .49
These three criminal statutes, on their face, clearly impose 
criminal liability for acts related to entry on false documents, and 
are not discussed as part of the immunity from immigration or civil 
penalties described in the grant of asylum.50  When asylum is 
granted it is granted for an indefinite period.51  The grant of asylum 
means that, as long as asylum is granted, the alien cannot be 
returned to any country.52  An asylee may lose status due to (1) 
fraud in the application, (2) the application being filed after April 
1, 1997, where the person meets one of the categories of 
ineligibility defined in INA section 208(c)(2), or (3) the applicant 
having applied after April 1, 1997, where the person no longer has 
a well-founded fear because the conditions in the country of origin 
have changed.53  An alien may have withholding revoked when (1) 
there is no longer a fear of persecution because of changes in the 
country of origin, (2) there is fraud in the application, or (3) he or 
she falls under one of the grounds (such as having been convicted 
of committing a serious crime) which would have initially barred 
withholding.54  Congress has failed to establish a similar immunity 
for criminal prosecutions for commission of the same acts. 
IX. REMOVAL FOR POST-ASYLUM CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 
There is no dispute that asylum is not a grant of impunity, and 
that the grant of asylum does not create immunity from 
deportation for crimes committed after the grant of asylum.55  And 
the Immigration Code does permit deportation for criminal 
 49. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006). 
 50. See 67 No. 30 INTERPRETER RELEASES 887, 888 (1990) (discussing the 
inability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to detain and deny parole 
to a political refugee based solely on the refugee’s use of false documents). 
 51. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(e) (2008). 
 52. See Andriansian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 n.14 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 53. 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a) (2008). 
 54. § 208.24(b); IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 
495 (10th ed. 2006). 
 55. Crimes involving moral turpitude, for example, are bars to admissibility 
and also make an alien removable from the United States.  INA  
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006). 
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convictions based on the presentation of false documents or fraud 
after the initial asylum request has been granted.56  Under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227, aliens are subject to deportation upon conviction of crimes 
of moral turpitude (including fraud) which carry a sentence of one 
year or more,57 and for violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1546,58 which 
imposes criminal penalties for presentation of false immigration 
documents.59
This means that, on its face, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 authorizes 
deportation for precisely the same factual admissions necessary to 
the initial grant of asylum before an immigration judge, when 
those admissions are also violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1543, 1544 and 
1546.  And although Congress enacted “asylum” provisions which 
act as a complete defense to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or § 
1227, these exceptions do not specifically apply as defenses to 
criminal prosecutions.  In the absence of judicial or Congressional 
intervention expanding an administrative grant of asylum into a 
defense to subsequent criminal charges, the Justice Department 
Criminal Division is free to assert that: 
1. Congress must have intended to limit executive branch 
discretion to carry out removal and deportation 
proceedings by imposing the asylum provisions in 8 U.S.C.  
 § 1158; 
2. Congress did not intend to limit executive branch 
discretion in bringing subsequent criminal charges based 
on the same acts at issue in the asylum claim because it did 
not specifically set out 8 U.S.C. § 1158 as a defense to 
prosecutions under either 18 U.S.C. § 1543, 1544, or 1546; 
or 
3. conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1543, 1544, and 1546 exposes 
the defendant to a second removal and deportation 
proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or § 1227, since the 
conviction occurs following the grant of asylum. 
This interpretation of the reach of 8 U.S.C. § 1158, as applied 
to admittedly false documents presented at the time of entry “for 
the purpose of escaping immediate danger from an alien’s country 
 56. INA § 237(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(B) (2006). 
 57. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006). 
 58. Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006)). 
 59. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006).  An alien who admits committing a crime 
or who admits to committing elements of certain crimes is inadmissible.  INA 
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2008).  See also KURZBAN, supra 
note 54, at 52. 
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of origin or resettlement, or for the purpose of gaining entry into 
the United States,”60 can hardly be characterized as either logical or 
rational.  And it renders the asylum provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1158 a 
practical nullity, particularly when the entry on false documents has 
been fully revealed and litigated in immigration proceedings which 
resulted in the grant of asylum in the first place. 
X. DISCRETIONARY EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH POWER 
Prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003, immigration matters were under 
the jurisdiction of the Justice Department’s Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) and the Attorney General.61  However, 
INS was absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security, 
headed by a new cabinet level secretary appointed by the 
President.62  Its enforcement responsibilities were assigned to the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) and 
immigration decision-making was assigned to the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS).63
During the period when the Justice Department had 
jurisdiction over immigration matters, the Department and 
Attorney General possessed broad discretion to initiate removal 
proceedings against any non-citizen, but this discretion was not 
without limit.64  Similarly, the Justice Department and Attorney 
General had—and retained—broad discretion to initiate criminal 
prosecutions,65 but this discretion, too, had limitations.66  Prior to 
the separation of immigration matters from the Justice 
Department, the Attorney General was in the anomalous position 
of granting asylum through delegation of authority to an 
immigration judge and criminally indicting the same refugee on 
the same facts. 
The separation of immigration enforcement and decision-
 60. Akinade v. INS, 196 F.3d 951, 955 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 61. See 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 33 (2008). 
 62. See id.
 63. Id. 
 64. See Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1950); DiPeppe v. 
Quarantillo, 337 F.3d 326, 327 (3rd Cir. 2003); Abdulah v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 543, 
549 (3rd Cir. 2001); Kowalczyk v. INS, 245 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2001); 
Akbarin v. INS, 699 F.2d 839, 846 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 65. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 
 66. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962); United States v. Rushing, 313 
F.3d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 2002). 
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making from the Justice Department to the Department of 
Homeland Security makes the apparent contradiction less obvious, 
but no less real.  Since it is the President who, in the first instance, 
possesses and delegates the power to determine whether an 
applicant is a refugee, the grant of asylum by a BCIS immigration 
judge, rather than an INS judge, is no less an exercise of executive 
branch decision-making.  Similarly, the Attorney General and 
Justice Department are delegated certain powers by the President, 
and respect that must be accorded to administrative findings of an 
executive branch administrative law judge remains essentially the 
same. 
In the absence of a specific congressional enactment that 
extends executive branch administrative findings to a defense to 
executive branch-initiated criminal prosecutions, it must fall to the 
courts to find a conceptual foundation upon which the 
administrative asylum finding might be interposed to prevent a 
subsequent indictment and conviction based on the same facts.  
Two possible approaches arise from Fifth Amendment principles 
and the possible application of estoppel principles to the factual 
findings upon which asylum was granted under either common law 
or due process principles. 
XI. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND POST-ASYLUM CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTION 
Of course, it goes without saying that due process prohibitions 
against compelled testimony apply to criminal prosecutions for 
fraud or the use of false documents, but are not relevant to the 
requirement that an asylum applicant must testify under oath as a 
necessary condition to the favorable exercise of executive branch 
discretion in granting asylum status.67  However, when a 
discretionary grant of asylum by one agency of the executive 
branch is followed by a discretionary criminal prosecution on the 
same facts by another agency of the same executive branch, it 
would seem that due process principles might be employed to 
prevent the contradictory use of executive branch discretion.  The 
argument is even more compelling when a conviction would 
expose the refugee to a second deportation proceeding based on 
 67. Burden of proof is placed squarely on the asylum seeker.  8 C.F.R.  
§ 208.13(a) (2008).  The testimony must be detailed and specific.  INS v. Elias-
Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). 
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the same false document entry into the United States. 
Another possible approach might arise from the due process 
obligation of the prosecution in a criminal case to prove all 
elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.68  Once a 
refugee has carried the burden of proof necessary to be granted 
asylum status by one agency of the executive branch by testifying in 
a contested hearing, it would seem obvious that another agency of 
that same executive branch would be unable to carry the much 
greater burden of proof required for a criminal conviction.69
Finally, the due process doctrine prohibits the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion to punish the exercise of a defendant’s 
rights.70  A presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness arises when 
post-trial prosecutorial discretion increases a defendant’s liability, 
but in necessarily discretionary pre-trial prosecutorial decision-
making only actual vindictiveness is prohibited.71  However, when a 
refugee has succeeded in “proving-up” an asylum claim, subsequent 
criminal prosecution on the same issues would seem to raise many 
of the same concerns regarding improper use of prosecutorial 
discretion to punish the exercise of the right to claim asylum. 
XII.   COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND ASYLUM PROCEEDINGS 
Another approach might be the use of equitable principles of 
estoppel to prevent the re-litigation of previously determined facts.  
This has long been recognized as a means of preventing a 
defendant from having to litigate the same facts against the same 
plaintiff, in a defensive use of collateral estoppel.72  Further, the 
Supreme Court has held that, even in the absence of the common 
law requirement of “mutuality of estoppel,” due process is not 
offended if estoppel is used to preclude a defendant from re-
litigating claims it has previously litigated against a different 
plaintiff, provided the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in a previous proceeding.73
However, given the differing burdens of proof in criminal and 
civil cases, a criminal acquittal in which the prosecution failed to 
 68. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970). 
 69. See United States v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 26–27 (1974). 
 70. See Nancy J. McCurley, Prosecutorial Discretion, 71 GEO L.J. 449, 451 (1982). 
 71. 2 DAVID S. RUDSTEIN, C. PETER ERLINDER & DAVID C. THOMAS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW § 9:06 (2008). 
 72. Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill., 402 U.S. 313, 328–29 (1995). 
 73. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 322 (1999). 
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carry its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
prevent the litigation of the same facts in a civil proceeding that 
were at issue in the criminal proceeding.  Conversely, however, 
failure of the government to prevail in a civil proceeding must 
preclude a criminal prosecution on the same facts.  Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is impossible for facts not proved by either a 
preponderance, clear and convincing evidence, or any other lesser 
civil standard. 
The question is whether the findings of an administrative 
immigration proceeding can have preclusive effect in subsequent 
criminal proceedings arising from the same facts.  The Court’s 
reasoning in the Parklane case suggests that such an application of 
estoppel principles is possible, and perhaps desirable. 
In applying its due process analysis to prevent the re-litigation 
of facts previously litigated, the basis for the claimed preclusion was 
an administrative proceeding in which the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) had prevailed in claims of improper corporate 
conduct against Parklane Hosiery Co.  In a subsequent 
stockholders derivative action against the corporation, the plaintiff 
sought to prevent the defendant corporation from re-litigating facts 
that had been alleged by the SEC.74  The Court held that due 
process permitted the plaintiff to prevent the corporation from re-
litigating factual defenses which it had asserted and upon which it 
had not prevailed in the SEC proceeding because the defendant 
had the opportunity and incentive to fully litigate the issue in the 
administrative proceeding.75
Nothing in Parklane suggests that findings from an 
administrative hearing before an immigration judge, initiated by 
INS or ICE, should be treated any differently than administrative 
proceedings initiated by the SEC.76  Because the subsequent 
proceeding at issue is a criminal proceeding, rather than a civil suit 
as was the case in Parklane, it would seem that the case for issue 
preclusion is even more compelling—particularly since the party 
against whom the estoppel would be asserted would be the same 
party (i.e. the executive branch), with the same incentive to oppose 
the grant of asylum, and because it is well-established that the alien 
in immigration proceedings has the burden of proof to establish 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 351. 
 76. See id. 
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both identity and eligibility for asylum.77
With respect to the factual questions of (a) the “justification” 
for commission of a lesser offense (presenting false documents) to 
prevent a larger harm (persecution),78 and (b) the absence of 
culpable mens rea under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1543 and 1546, which 
require presentation with the willful intention to deceive U.S. 
authorities regarding a material fact,79 both were fully litigated.  
The use of collateral estoppel to prevent the same acts from being 
used as the basis for a criminal prosecution would be consistent 
with the due process requirements set out by the Supreme Court in 
the Parklane case. 
XIII.   JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND “CHANGE OF POSITION” 
However, viewed at another level, the determination by the 
executive branch immigration judge that the asylee had carried his 
burden to establish that he properly qualified for asylum, despite 
having presented admittedly false documents to gain entry to the 
United States, should be binding on other executive branch 
entities as well.  Principles of judicial estoppel are intended to 
protect the integrity of the Court and should be invoked to prevent 
a perversion of the judicial process.  It is intended to protect the 
Courts from a litigant changing positions in two different legal 
proceedings when its interests have changed.80
Given the decision of the executive branch immigration judge 
granting asylum over the opposition of other executive branch 
lawyers, the decision to seek criminal prosecution despite the grant 
of asylum can be seen as a change in position by the executive 
branch.  It was already determined that the use of false documents 
did not constitute a basis for denying the asylum claims.  Under 
such circumstances, some of the Circuits have held that the district 
 77. INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); Olujoke v. Gonzalez, 411 
F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2005); Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 
1987); In re Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120, 124 (BIA 1989). 
 78. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409–11 (1980); United States v. 
Khalje, 658 F.2d 90, 93 (2nd Cir. 1981) (holding a justification defense available 
but not applicable on the facts). 
 79. See United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898, 902 (2nd Cir. 1963). 
 80. Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1996); accord 
Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1987).  See also United 
States v. Rushing, 313 F.3d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 2002) (regarding a “change in 
position” by the Justice Department giving rise to Due Process issues requiring a 
hearing as to the motivations animating the change in position). 
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court is obligated to hold a hearing to determine whether the 
change was based upon proper motive.81
Even in the absence of improper motive in the record, a 
drastic change in position merits a hearing into whether the 
change in position was a result of improper motive.  Such a hearing 
was ordered in a case where a prosecutor claimed before a jury that 
the Justice Department would deport a witness who had confessed 
to perjury; after the trial was over, no such deportation took place.  
The appeals court, in remanding the case for fact-finding into 
improper prosecutorial motive, observed that “[t]he contrast 
between the government’s stated intention and what actually 
occurred [was] too jarring to overlook.”82
However, the application of estoppel principles to government 
actions comes under special scrutiny.83  Beyond the factors usually 
applicable to non-government actors, it requires that the 
government commit a wrongful act84 that causes serious injustice, 
and that the public’s interest will not be damaged by the 
application of the doctrine.85  The question for the courts to decide 
is whether it is in the public interest to invoke equitable principles 
to estop an agency of the executive branch from bringing criminal 
charges for the same acts that an administrative judge, of the same 
executive branch, found were not subject to penalty based on the 
defendant having carried his civil burden.86
XIV.   CONCLUSION 
The apparent contradiction between a grant of asylum (which 
 81. See United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d 22, 26–27 (2nd Cir. 1996). 
 82. Rushing, 313 F.3d at 436. 
 83. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 
(1984). 
 84. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 787 (1981). 
 85. Morgan v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 86. Principles of res judicata may also prevent a litigant in a previous 
proceeding from asserting claims that could have been asserted but were not.  Had 
the prior proceeding been a civil proceeding, and had the executive branch failed 
to prevail on a preponderance of the evidence standard, a criminal prosecution 
(or a subsequent civil complaint) on the same “core” of facts would be barred by 
principles of res judicata.  See Semteck Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 
U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (which lower courts have also applied to quasi judicial 
proceedings).  See, e.g., Graybill v. United States Postal Service, 782 F.2d 1567, 1571 
(citing Chisholm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1981)), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986); Reynolds v. Comm’r, 861 F.2d 469, 472–74 (6th Cir. 
1988). 
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is a defense to civil immigration penalties) and the absence of a 
defense to subsequent criminal prosecution for use of the same 
false documents upon which the asylum claim was grounded would 
best be resolved through Congressional action.  An amendment to 
existing immigration statutes that clearly extended immunity from 
prosecution to issues considered by the immigration judge in 
granting asylum status would make clear that the contradictory use 
of executive branch discretion to grant asylum and then prosecute 
for the same acts does not comport with Congressional intent. 
However, absent Congressional action, the courts have an 
obligation under common-law principles to prevent a litigant from 
benefiting by taking two different positions against the same party.  
Moreover, Fifth Amendment principles relating to coerced 
testimony and fundamental fairness in the federal courts also 
provide potential judicial remedies for the contradictory exercise of 
executive branch discretionary powers.  In the absence of 
principled limitations upon the criminalization of false document 
asylum claims, the invitation to the abuse of the executive branch 
power remains undiminished. 
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